The corporate governance environment in the UK and US is generally thought to be hostile to the emergence of cooperative employment relations of the kind exemplified by labour-management partnerships. We discuss case study evidence from the UK which suggests that, contrary to this widespread perception, enduring and proactive partnerships may develop, in conditions where management can convince shareholders of the long-term gains from this approach, and where other regulatory factors operate to extend the time-horizon for financial returns. We conclude that there is more scope than is commonly allowed for measures which could reconcile liquidity in capital markets with cooperation in labour relations.
after the contractual claims of employees, commercial creditors and others have been met.
１
Because they are the last to receive anything in the event of insolvency, they implicitly assume the risk of failure. Conversely, shareholders gain in proportion to the organisation's success. Although, in law, they are not entitled to receive a dividend, in practice, the linking of dividends to corporate performance aligns shareholder returns directly to the success or failure of the enterprise. They also benefit through the increase in the value of their shares.
It is often claimed, in particular by institutional investors, that shareholders are the 'owners' of the company, but this does not accurately reflect their legal position in either the UK or the US. Shareholders do not own the company, nor do they own its assets (Parkinson, 2003) . Nevertheless, by virtue of the rules of company law and corporate governance practice, the ownership of common voting stock does give them certain other property rights which have important implications for incentives and hence for efficiency.
In particular, shareholders of listed companies -that is, in essence, companies whose shares are traded on a stock exchange -can dispose of their shares in an open market, providing a way by which control of the corporation can be transferred. The orthodox view in the Anglo-American system is that market liquidity -the ability of shareholders to exit at low cost -enhances the organisational efficiency of the enterprise. Shareholders have a particularly strong incentive to monitor management, derived from the close link between shareholder wealth and the success or failure of the firm; the sale of stock is the mechanism by which this power is exercised. Managerial failure is punished by a fall in investor confidence and a declining share price. In effect, the stock market, once it attains a certain degree of liquidity, becomes a market for corporate control, in which rival management teams bid to persuade shareholders to sell them controlling interests by offering them a premium over current share prices.
It can be argued that employees and other long-term stakeholders have just as valid an argument as shareholders for being considered the residual claimants. This is because they are equally likely to make relation-specific investments (in human capital, for example) which will be at risk if the enterprise fails (Blair, 1995; Kelly and Parkinson, 1998; Blair and Kochan, 2000) . The response of mainstream corporate governance theorists is that while it may be the case that many groups have a stake in the firm, only the shareholders have sufficient homogeneity of interests as a group to hold managers to account in an effective way (Hansmann, 1996) . From this perspective, compromises in the pre-eminent rights of shareholders embodied in, for example, codetermination laws and laws requiring employee consultation, are inherently inefficient, and survive only
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ITEC Research Paper 05-04 p.6 because the costs of unraveling politically-motivated compromises are too high (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001) .
A large proportion of US and UK productive capacity, in relative terms, is held in the form of listed companies. In both systems, stock market capitalization has substantially exceeded national GDP since the mid-1980s (although the degree to which this is the case has fallen considerably following the end of the bull market in 2000 and subsequent stock market decline) (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005) . US and UK listed companies, as we noted above, are mostly characterised by dispersed-share ownership;
that is to say, the company's share capital is scattered among a large number of individual holdings, with no dominant or controlling interest. This is the model described by Berle and Means (1932) in their seminal study. However, to a large extent in the UK, and to a lesser degree in the US, the principal shareholders are no longer households or individuals, but instead financial institutions, that is to say, insurance companies and pension funds, who act on behalf of their policy-holders and beneficiaries. The day-to-day control and management of their shareholdings is normally given over to specialised fund managers. Typically, the share structure of a UK-listed company will consist of several blocks (normally of around 5%, and rarely more than 10%) that are controlled by fund managers on behalf of a number of institutional clients. The dominant block-holding model, in which one shareholder holds a majority or near-majority stake, is rare in UK listed companies. Methods for securing dominant blocks through corporate cross-shareholdings (which until recently represented the norm in France: see Goyer and Hancké, 2005) and bank-led governance of the kind that has operated (in various different ways) in Germany and Japan (see Berglöf, 1997; Franks and Mayer, 1998) , are not often observed in the US and the UK.
In principle, as we have just seen, dispersed share ownership strongly privileges exit over voice as the mechanism by which shareholders can exercise control over management. The disadvantage of dispersed ownership comes in the form of the high costs of voice: effectively coordinating the direct involvement of shareholders in the conduct of corporate affairs is difficult in practice. To some extent, this problem may be overcome through the actions of institutional shareholders (or, in many cases, the fund managers who represent them). Where a few institutions between them hold a majority or near-majority stake, they can often exercise a powerful if informal influence behind the scenes in the management of companies (see Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann, 2003 But even exit carries with it potentially high coordination costs. The hostile takeover can be thought of as a mechanism for overcoming some of these costs in the context of share dispersion. A hostile takeover is, in effect, an appeal to the shareholders of a listed company to sell a controlling interest to the bidder. The shareholders are induced to exit by the offer of a premium above the current market value of their shares, the cost of which the new owner will aim to recover by restructuring the company (which can be interpreted as either running it more efficiently, or extracting rents from employees and other stakeholders: see Shleifer and Summers, 1988) . In principle, the possibility of hostile bid being mounted should act as a powerful deterrent against under-performance by managers. However, the collective action costs of voting in response to a 'tender offer' of this kind are considerable, since shareholders have strong incentives to 'hold out' in the expectation of being able to extract a higher price near the point at which the bidder gains a controlling stake. Thus regulation is essential. Securities regulationthe body of law governing the issuing and trading of shares and other financial instruments -offers various sets of solutions to this problem (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997 The overall effect of these legal rules and extra-legal norms is to entrench shareholder value as the dominant objective of corporate management. The source for the so-called 'shareholder value' or 'shareholder primacy' norm is only partially located in company law. Indeed, despite the association made by some influential analyses between the common law of the US and UK and high levels of investor protection (La Porta et al. 1997 , 1999 , close inspection reveals that the law provides little or no support for the notion that companies are run for their shareholders as 'owners' of the enterprise.
Since the late nineteenth century, UK company law, in particular, has largely aimed to protect the autonomy of boards from day-to-day shareholder pressures (see Davies, 1997: 183-187 Slinger, 1997).
In the UK, the government's recent review of company law has confirmed that boards are permitted to take a view based on 'enlightened shareholder value' -which seeks to strike a balance between the competing interests of the different stakeholders -if their objective is to benefit the shareholders in the long run (Company Law Review, 1999 . confidentiality (see Deakin and Morris, 2001: 808) . The overall effect of these various rules is, in principle, to create strong incentives for boards to prioritise short-term shareholder interests over other concerns when faced with a hostile bid (Deakin and Slinger, 1997) , and empirical research, based on case studies of takeovers from the mid1990s and interviews with bid participants, suggests that this incentive structure is reflected in the way boards respond to bids in practice (Deakin, Hobbs, Nash and Slinger, 2003) .
By international standards, there is a high level of hostile takeover activity in the UK and US. Even so, the numbers of hostile bids in a given year will be in the tens rather than the hundreds, whereas the number of listed companies in each country runs into the thousands (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997 the takeover mechanism has been the principal catalyst for corporate restructuring in both the US and the UK during the last two decades of the twentieth century, and virtually no industrial or services sector has escaped the changes induced by takeover activity. In this way, it would seem that corporate governance rules have indeed had a major effect on the industrial structure of the British and American economies.
The specific issue to which this analysis gives rise is whether dispersed shareholder ownership constrains the development of a 'partnership' approach in employment relations of the kind needed to promote competitiveness. With dispersion, shareholders benefit from the possibility of low-cost exit. The resulting liquidity in capital markets enables them to take advantage of alternative investment opportunities, and in principle permits more efficient resource allocation. The disadvantage is that other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers and customers contributing firm-specific inputs, knowing that the shareholders may switch their investments at short notice, may be dissuaded from making long-term investments of their own in the firm (Franks and Mayer, 1998: 728) .
One of the very few studies to make the impact of corporate governance on labourmanagement partnerships is Kochan and Rubinstein's study of Saturn, the US vehicle manufacturer which was set up as an experiment in partnership between General Motors and the United Auto Workers union (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000) . Despite early success, the Saturn experiment proved to be far from trouble-free. On the one hand, critics taking a shareholder perspective argued that the considerable investments made by the company in the Saturn plant had failed to produce an adequate return (see Monks and Minow, 2004: 361-2) . On the other, elements within the union claimed that the abandonment of seniority-based payment and job security systems was an excessive price to pay for greater employee involvement in the design of working practices (Rubinstein and Kochan, 2001 ) Thus the message to emerge from the Saturn case is that the tension between the priority granted to shareholder interests by the US corporate governance system, and efforts to build labour-management partnerships which will endure over time, remains, at best, unresolved. On the basis of the interviews which formed the basis for the study, a distinction emerged between partnerships which, on the one hand, were 'proactive' and 'mature', and those on the other which were 'reactive', 'weak' and 'disintegrating' Wilkinson, 2003, 2005) . These characterizations were drawn from the interviewees' own reported perceptions of the partnership arrangements in which they had been involved.
Proactive partnerships were those in which the union's role was broadly conceived in terms of the promotion of a high-trust culture based on functional flexibility, with management, in turn, providing the conditions for employees to make the necessary investments in human capital. In reactive partnerships, by comparison, the union's role tended to be confined to dealing with the immediate consequences of restructurings in terms of large-scale redundancies, while management made a minimal commitment to employment security. Mature and enduring partnerships were those which survived moments of crisis caused by external pressures, in which both sides were willing to make relation-specific investments which would be put at risk if the company faced the prospect In 2000, the company's corporate governance environment changed significantly as the group's parent company increased its issued share capital by 5.1% to fund a number of acquisitions. The 'voting' and 'capital' shares were merged into a single, voting class.
As a result, its shareholder base became much more dispersed, with only one pension scheme holding more than 5% of the total share capital. The geographical distribution of shares also shifted, with only 30% of the shares now held in continental European hands, and 56% in British or American ownership. However, the change did not dilute the company's commitment to partnership with its employees. In 2000, the group launched a new human resource strategy as 'a core element' of its overall business strategy, and set up a new corporate human resources function 'to strengthen its employee development efforts.' According to the UK finance director, the changing structure of share ownership would not become a negative factor for partnership because investors 'know what they are buying into'.
Other cases in the study also suggest that mature, 'proactive' partnership can be developed and maintained within the UK corporate governance environment. This is indicated by the experience of two utility companies, Warmwell and Hearwell.
Warmwell's personnel director told us, 'we have excellent relations with our trade unions. We sit at the table with them at the national and the local level. We ... recognise the value of a legitimate role for the trade unions. Why fight? Why go back to the seventies? If there is a problem, we share the problem and the solution.' At Hearwell, too, the union described a mature partnership, explaining that evidence could be found in the fact that over a two-year period, the company and union had negotiated a complete overhaul of the system of grading structures, pay and conditions. In the opinion of the union official we interviewed, the result was a win-win situation: the company achieved greater flexibility and employees achieved better pay and a reduced Warmwell's personnel director told us that 'we spend a lot of time trying to educate the stock market on what we're about…the institutions are seeing us in a better light…All of our strategies are about building businesses. We believe that you can't do that in the short term…In every pound that we use to acquire or to grow organically, we're looking for a long term return.' In 1999, Hearwell told us that 'we have a different shareholder base to our competitors. We have a lot of pension funds and so on who are interested in long-running, continuing cash flows rather than sparky value appreciation and decline … I think the other thing is that we are quite explicit that we are a medium term stock.' When Hearwell's share price fell in response to mounting debts following a series of acquisitions and the failure of certain investments to produce expected returns, the response of the union was significant. The union was careful to avoid arguing that financial pressures were having a negative effect on labour-management relations, because, in its view, the need to satisfy financial market concerns could 'distract' management from developing long-term strategies. The union argued that when share prices fell, management was prone to making 'knee jerk reactions' and attacking costs simply to demonstrate to financial analysts that some action was being taken. As a result, the union declined to join in public criticism of the company. Instead, it urged management to be less defensive in putting its message across to the financial markets, and to be more aggressive in publicising the company's long-term achievements. The case studies also demonstrate complexity of the relationship between partnership in employment relations and the operation of the market for corporate control. In the case of Warmwell, partnership had, paradoxically, been employed as a mechanism to assist the company in the takeover process. According to Warmwell's personnel director, the company's acquisition of another UK utility was made possible by Warmwell's labour management strategy: '[we] use our trade unions … to talk with the local unions and say "we know you don't like the idea of being taken over. We don't like the idea of you being taken over. But if you're going to be taken over, it's better that it's these guys
because they know what they're going to do and they'll treat you firmly but very fairly"'. A hostile takeover was used in this case to import the partnership philosophy into a company which had previously been opposed to the concept: after the acquisition was completed, the company reintroduced union recognition arrangements which the previous management had removed in the wake of privatisation.
The takeover battle was bitterly fought. Warmwell initiated the bid by making an offer to purchase shares in the target company at a premium of almost 40% over the then market price. The essence of its bid was that the target was at that point a 'high cost, high tariff' utility, which could be run more effectively in the future by means of Warmwell's superior 'expertise in best practice and cost control programmes'. The target responded in a manner typical of companies faced with an unwelcome bid, by attempting to demonstrate to its shareholders that it could return sufficient value to them in the short term to retain their loyalty. In effect, this was an effort to counter the bidder's offer of short-term gain (in the form of the premium over the pre-bid market price of the target's shares) with one of its own. Here, it took the form of a promise to return cash to the shareholders which would be generated in large part by a redundancy exercise aimed at cutting costs. Thus halfway through the bid process, the target announced that it would be cutting 17% of its workforce in the then financial year, a figure equivalent to over 500 jobs, 200 or so more than had previously been announced.
In the event it went even further, dismissing nearly 1,000 workers while the bid was in progress, including 500 in one day. However, this did not prevent the vast majority of its shareholders from accepting the offer tabled by Warmwell, which duly took control.
In this case, a hostile takeover led to a union-unfriendly employer being replaced by one which was considerably more receptive to union involvement. Whether the bidder would have made redundancies on the same scale as the target, had they not been made prior to the bid going through, cannot be known. However, the case study suggests, contrary to a widely received view, that hostile takeovers may select for stakeholder- the National Health Service sector at this time required evaluation of the employmentrelations records of firms who were bidding for contracts; they also entitled trade unions to interview and submit a report on short-listed bidders. According to the guidelines, the underlying logic of this approach was that companies with poor labour relations and inadequate investment in staff often delivered a low level of service. We found strong evidence of the supportive role of PFI regulation in the NHS in the case of Cleanwell UK, which had been highly successful in biding for this type of contract (see Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson, 2002: 346) .
Utility regulation provides another example. Although this form of regulation gives precedence to customers and the community's interest in the environment, rather than to employees, by setting quality standards it can underpin a partnership approach in labour-management relations. In particular, the imposition of guaranteed customer service standards by utility regulators serves as a significant support mechanism for partnership because it means that while there are pressures to cut costs, there is a limit to how far these can be permitted to undermine standards of customer service. Thus The stress on customer service in utility regulation is nevertheless important in encouraging active partnership in conjunction with the operation of the takeover mechanism. Warmwell's bid for another UK utility company, considered above, was assisted by the publication by the regulator of information relating to levels of customer service and organisational costs in companies which had recently been privatised. On this basis, Warmwell was able to benchmark its own performance against industry standards and identify a suitable target for acquisition. As an interviewee put it to us:
'The skills that we built through benchmarking were just the same ones that we needed to evaluate potential acquisitions… We looked at [the target] and said we know what it can do: its costs per customer per kilometre of line, its fault rates and so on were all in the public domain from the regulatory process. We knew the international benchmarking levels possible from looking at … other leading companies. We could say -if that company was under our control, this is what it would be worth to us. We then looked at what we would have to pay for it.'
Here, the information generated by the regulatory process was used by the company to exploit what it considered to be its comparative advantage in being better able than the takeover target to meet high standards of service.
In Tenswell, by contrast, over 80% of the workforce was engaged in the production of a product where markets were highly volatile and price sensitive and there was, at that point, substantial global over-supply. Regulation had been aimed at increasing the intensity of national competition through the removal of barriers to trade, and the market was more or less unregulated in terms of price and quality standards. It was these conditions which imposed on the company the short-term time horizon under Regulation of product and service quality, of the kind observed in most utility sectors and in certain others, favours the emergence of stable partnerships. This is because, in these markets, profitability is linked to the ability of companies to maintain a high and consistent quality of service for end users. As a result, companies are better able to convince shareholders to take the view that they will reap significant returns over the long term from a stakeholder approach. ６ In the absence of these stabilizing factors, however, goodwill between labour and management is not enough to sustain a partnership approach when it plainly conflicts with shareholder interests. In this case, the pressure to meet shareholder value over the short term tends to prevail.
Conclusion
The evidence which we have presented in this paper suggests that successful labourmanagement partnerships tend to be found in contexts where both sides can make credible commitments to cooperate over the medium to long term. The key role played by corporate governance and the regulatory framework is to extend the time period over which cooperative strategies can be played out. This can be done in a number of ways, most notably through product market regulations which encourage competition on the basis of quality rather than price, and through employment regulations which grant workers significant voice rights. Under these conditions, managers can develop corporate governance practices which encourage shareholders to take a long-term view of their investments. Where they are absent, partnership arrangements are highly vulnerable to shareholder pressure, no matter how much goodwill is invested by labour and management.
The evidence on which we rely comes from a small sample of firms in sectors which are not necessarily typical. However, longitudinal, micro-institutional case studies of the kind reported here provide a particular type of information, relating to the internal dynamics of relations between corporate stakeholders, which may not otherwise be available. It is interesting that the picture we get from this type of study does not necessarily fit the Tenswell, like the other names used to designate the case study companies, is a fictitious name.
６
It may, conversely, be the case that shareholders are themselves increasingly receptive to this message, by virtue of the need for pension funds, in particular, to provide long-term financial stability for their beneficiaries, and that regulation can 
